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Beyond Westphalia: Competitive Legalization in
Emerging Transnational Regulatory Systems•
Errol Meidinger••

Abstract
This paper analyzes several emerging transnational regulatory systems
that engage, but are not centered on state legal systems. Driven primarily
by civil society organizations, the new regulatory systems use
conventional technical standard setting and certification techniques to
establish market-leveraged, social and environmental regulatory
programs. These programs resemble state regulatory programs in many
important respects, and are increasingly legalized. Individual sectors
generally have multiple regulatory programs that compete with, but also
mimic and reinforce each other. While forestry is the most developed
example, similar patterns are evident in agriculture, fisheries, apparel, and
mining, among other sectors.
The paper describes the institutional structures and routines of the new
regulatory systems, their interactions with state based systems, and some
possible broader implications for law and society. Among other things, it
notes that the emerging regulatory systems permeate their sectors with
increasingly broad and deep rule systems and seek to remain highly
dynamic at the same time. The paper closes with a brief discussion of
whether the systems might be sketching the outlines of new forms of
transnational democracy.
Keywords: certification, democracy, environmental law, environmental
management, fisheries, forestry, globalization, human rights, international
law, legalization, legal pluralism, mining, organic agriculture, participation,
polyarchy, regulation, socio-legal studies, standardization, sustainable
development, sweatshops, transnational society, transparency
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1. Introduction
Remarkable new supra-governmental, transnational regulatory systems
are taking shape around us. Driven primarily by civil society organizations,
but also by governments and industry associations, these systems draw
on conventional technical standard setting and certification techniques to
establish market-leveraged, social and environmental regulatory
programs. They go beyond traditional standard setting, however, in
seeking to protect interests not directly involved in the market chain.
Moreover, these systems incorporate plural rule-making, adjudication, and
enforcement programs. The programs constantly compete with, but also
mimic and reinforce each other. While the most developed example is in
forestry, similar systems are also present in agriculture, fisheries, apparel,
and mining, among other sectors. They share the assumptions that
enterprises around the world should be held to common standards and
that compliance with those standards can be assured through use of
formally independent expert auditors. The various standards, procedures,
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and roles of the actors are generally defined in terms of formalized rules,
rights, and duties based on normative criteria in ways very similar to those
of state based legal systems.
This paper examines forestry regulation as a central case but also draws
parallels to the other sectors mentioned above. ‘Regulation’ here means
simply a purposive, organized and sustained effort to establish a general
and consistent order in a field of human activity (e.g., Black 2002). Since it
typically centers on rules defined in terms of rights and duties, with
differentiated official roles and normative justifications, regulation is a form
of law, but one that is characterized by a reliance on credentialed experts
who are expected to manage a field and to learn and adapt based on
experience.
This paper first describes the forest certification regulatory system and the
process by which it has been established (Section 2), next discusses its
relationship to state governance systems (Section 3), makes some
comparisons to other sectors (Section 4), and finally considers the impacts
(Section 5) and possible broader implications for law and society (Section
6) of certification-centered transnational regulatory systems. Overall, it
describes a set of multi-centered, competitive regulatory systems that are
increasingly rule-permeated and changeable at the same time. The paper
closes with a brief discussion of whether these systems might be
sketching the outlines of new forms of transnational democracy.

2. Forest Certification
Forest certification was instituted by a loose-knit group of extragovernmental ‘regulatory entrepreneurs’ (see Meidinger 1985) in response
to the failure of the Westphalian system to curb rapid tropical forest
destruction, a process that came to be understood as reaching crisis
dimensions in the 1980s (Humphreys 1996; Gale 1998). While there are
multiple reasons for tropical deforestation, a major one has been the
burgeoning importation of tropical timber by developed countries wanting
cheap wood (Brown 2001).
Exasperated with the failure of intergovernmental negotiations to
effectively address the problems of tropical ecosystem destruction and
biodiversity loss, some Northern environmental groups pursued a tropical
timber boycott, but dropped it when its potentially perverse consequences
of hurting proper tropical forest management and possibly speeding
agricultural conversion because of the decreased economic value of
forests became apparent. As an alternative, they tried to get the
intergovernmental system, via the International Tropical Timber
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Organization (ITTO), to establish a system for certifying sustainably
produced timber so that it could be distinguished and rewarded in
international markets. The idea was to convert the rapidly growing global
timber market into an engine of forest preservation, rather than
destruction. The ITTO, which consists of approximately 40 of the largest
tropical timber exporting and importing countries, refused to establish such
a system. Several Southern exporting countries evidently saw it as a
potential non-tariff barrier to trade in that northern environmental groups
might call for boycotts of non-certified timber.
As early as 1989 the non-profit US-based Rainforest Alliance established
its own program for certifying sustainable tropical timber – ‘SmartWood’.
While many of the larger environmental groups continued to pursue
intergovernmental regulatory solutions, they also began laying plans for
what they saw as the distinctly inferior option of establishing a freestanding non-governmental forest certification system. After the 1992 UN
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio failed to
achieve a binding forest convention these plans were put into motion with
the 1993 founding of the Forest Stewardship Council.
The FSC
Although discussions of creating an umbrella forest certification system
went back at least to 1990, the FSC faced a daunting set of challenges.
As suggested above, the FSC was founded by a small progressive
coalition of transnational environmental NGOs – primarily the Worldwide
Fund for Nature (WWF) and Greenpeace – together some high end wood
buyers, progressive foresters, and social activists. Most of the major
powers in forestry at the time were absent and many were hostile.
Moreover, nothing like a global system for certifying forest management
practices had ever been attempted. On the other hand, the standard
institutional methods of technical standard setting and certification were
available. So too were a professional forestry credo laying out the basic
elements of proper forestry and an emerging discourse of sustainable
development stressing a the interdependence of economic development,
environmental protection and social justice and the importance of using
participatory policy mechanisms. Moreover, forestry had long been a
relatively self-governing industry and had developed reasonably effective
methods of imposing ‘sustained yield’ forestry in most developed
countries, although these had recently been shown to leave out key
environmental and social concerns in many cases.
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Standard Setting
The FSC is constituted as a global, non-governmental, multi-stakeholder
organization, reflecting the ascendant canon that effective organizations
must incorporate the voices of all interests relevant to their missions. It is
governed by a ‘General Assembly’ organized in three chambers,
environmental, social, and economic, each with equal voting power (see
generally FSC 2006). The chambers are further subdivided into ‘Northern’
and ‘Southern’ sub-chambers, again with equal voting power, to
counterbalance the relative overrepresentation of northern interests. Day
to day management is delegated to an Executive Director who works in
close collaboration with a nine-member elected Board of Directors.
Membership in the FSC is open to all organizations and individuals who
subscribe to FSC’s mission (providing responsible management of the
worlds forests) and are endorsed by two existing members.
Shortly after its founding the FSC promulgated a set of ‘principles and
criteria’ (P&C) intended to govern proper forest management worldwide.
Bringing together tenets from forestry, environmental, and human rights
discourses, the P&C require compliance with applicable laws and treaties,
clear and adequate property rights, protection of indigenous, community,
and worker rights, full and efficient use of forest resources, and fairly
stringent environmental protection, among other things. These
requirements have been revised in limited ways over time and are given
further place-appropriate content in national and regional standard setting
processes.
Certification and Accreditation
Much of the FSC’s early work focused on accrediting and overseeing the
certification organizations whose job it is to ascertain and publicly verify
that certified companies in fact comply with the P&C as well as any
applicable national or regional standards. While certification organizations
are formally independent of the FSC, the quality of their work and their
public credibility are crucial to the success of the FSC program. A typical
FSC certification process includes, among other things, (1) an intensive
site visit by a team of certifiers possessing forest management,
environmental, and social expertise and seeking to ascertain compliance
with the full array of applicable standards (but with latitude to grant
certification despite minor shortcomings), (2) consultations with local
stakeholders, (3) preparation of a draft report which is subjected to peer
review by two or three external experts, (4) discussion of possible terms of
the certification with the applicant, including possible pre-conditions or
corrective actions to be taken within a specified amount of time, (5) an
official certification decision including final preconditions or corrective
action requirements, (6) a public summary of the decision containing
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‘sufficient information to make clear the correlation between the specific
results of the certification assessment and FSC principles’, (7) annual
audits, and (8) a full review for possible renewal every five years.
Certifiers thus combine the traditional public law functions of
administrative inspection and adjudication, but their services are paid for
by the by the applicants for certification. The risks of corruption posed by
this arrangement do not seem to have been a major concern of the FSC
system early on, evidently because of the faith in professionalism that
characterizes the forestry sector and the assumption that, if anything,
certifiers were likely to be too tough in doing the bidding of what was
perceived to be a zealous certification program. Nonetheless, the FSC set
up a system for auditing certification decisions and has suspended the
accreditation of certifiers on a few occasions. Over time the accreditation
and auditing program has become more formalized, and it was recently
made financially independent of the FSC.
Labeling
The FSC also developed standards for certifying the ‘chain of custody’ of
certified products. The original goal was to be able to prove that the wood
in any product carrying the FSC logo actually came from a certified forest.
This can be quite complicated in the highly differentiated, multi-supplier,
long distance, high volume, and low margin markets that characterize the
modern forestry sector. Over time the FSC certified content requirements
have become considerably looser, allowing certain products to carry the
logo based on a set percentage of FSC content.
Enforcement
While the FSC certification program was initially scorned or ignored by
most established forestry powers, it soon came to be perceived as a force
to be reckoned with. One of the most important reasons was a series of
campaigns by environmental activists to pressure major wood products
retailers to commit to buying FSC certified wood. British do-it-yourself
retailer B&Q quickly welcomed the FSC as a way of responding to activist
criticisms of its purchasing policies that predated the FSC’s founding.
American retailer Home Depot joined after several hundred well publicized
actions by the Rainforest Action Network (RAN) in its parking lots and
stores threatening to associate the Home Depot brand with rainforest
destruction (e.g. Sasser 2002). By thus focusing on key retailer links in the
extended global forest product chain activist groups were able to use
market relationships to leverage the FSC into an important new role in
forest governance. Leveraging market chains has become a primary
enforcement mechanism, although the official mechanisms include
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unannounced inspections, random auditing, and potential loss of
certificates.
Industry Based Programs
Although surprised and often offended by the rise of the FSC, many
traditional forestry interests responded quickly. North American industry
groups in particular were already worried about their declining public
image and promptly decided to establish their own forest certification
programs, the Sustainable Forestry Initiative (SFI) in the US and the
Canadian Standards Association (CSA) Forest Management standard in
Canada (see generally Cashore et al 2003). Program details and histories
are too complex to be recounted here, but the broad outlines are clear.
Both initiatives sought to develop programs that were acceptable to the
public but minimally onerous to industry. The SFI was established by the
largest forest products association in the US, the American Forest &
Paper Association (AF&PA), on its own motion. The CSA was established
by the Canadian national technical standard setting body in cooperation
with the Canadian forest products industry.
Management Systems
Although there were many differences between the programs, they both
favored the ‘environmental management system’ (EMS) approach that
had recently been developed by the International Organization for
Standardization (ISO) in its ISO 14000 series of standards (ISO 2006).
This approach relies on ‘installing’ an EMS in the firm which provides
mechanisms to (1) assess the environmental aspects of the firm’s
operations, (2) plan which ones to improve and how, (3) set measurable
goals for improvement, and (4) assign responsibilities for implementing,
monitoring, correcting failures, and revising plans to specific individuals. In
addition, flowing from the ‘total quality management’ movement of the
1980s, the EMS approach requires ‘continuous improvement’ in the
management system. Its stress on fully assessing the environmental
aspects of the firm’s activities expands upon the ‘environmental impact
assessment’ concept originally developed for public environmental
management, and may be particularly important for firms operating in
unfamiliar environments, as is often the case for global corporations.
The EMS approach differs from the ‘performance standard’
approach adopted by the FSC in that the firm, rather than the
external standard setting organization, is primarily responsible for
setting its goals. Moreover, what is audited is the presence of
management programs to pursue those goals rather than their
achievement. The management systems themselves seem to
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involve an intensification of internal rules, since auditors generally
for documentation of procedures and responsibilities, and for
documentary evidence that they are being carried out.
Federation
Industry based programs were also established in a variety of other
countries, including the major exporters of Malaysia, Brazil and
Indonesia. With the partial exception of the Indonesian program,
which is coordinated with the FSC, they all tended to see
themselves in opposition to the FSC, which they perceived as too
environmentalist dominated and stringent. In 1998-1999 a Europewide federation of forest certification programs was established.
The Pan-European Forest Certification Council (PEFC) defined
itself not as promulgating a single standard to be deployed worldwide, but rather as providing a common framework for the mutual
recognition of nationally based certification programs operating to
verify the sustainable forest management practices that were
believed already to exist in most European countries. Institutionally
and conceptually, it drew heavily on the experiences of the existing
certification programs as well as criteria and indicators that had
been produced by intergovernmental processes such as a series of
Ministerial Conferences on the Protection of Forests in Europe that
started in 1990 and continue to the present.
In 2003, PEFC went global, renaming itself the Programme for the
Endorsement of Forest Certification. It currently includes 32
nationally based programs, of which 22 have been officially
endorsed (PEFC 2006). Although they vary considerably, PEFC
programs tend to be more lenient than FSC ones, not only in terms
of standards, but also in terms of inspection and chain of custody
requirements. They thus tend to be less expensive to participate in
and appeal particularly to smaller land owners.
Convergence, Competition and Recentered Governance
The field of forest certification thus centers around two primary alliances.
On one side is the FSC with its orientation to relatively uniform
performance standards, including environmental and social concerns,
providing for low discretion on the part of firms and certifiers and a high
degree of multi-stakeholder control. On the other is the PEFC alliance,
with its preference for procedurally oriented management system
standards, focused primarily on locally defined best forestry practices,
high discretion, and a high degree of landowner and business control. And
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yet, the systems have also developed a growing number of similarities
over time.
Standards
There have been numerous and almost continuous changes in standards,
particularly in the PEFC programs as they seek to compete more
effectively in the broader field of certification. Thus, the categories and
language of standards have converged in numerous ways. While much of
this change has involved gradual ‘ratcheting up’ (Fung et al 2001,
Overdevest 2004) by PEFC members of their environmental standards
and occasional addition of social ones, a certain amount has also involved
concessions by the FSC to make its program more workable in the face of
market challenges. A good example is the adoption of the ‘percentage
claims’ policy discussed above. The FSC is also working on streamlined
standards for ‘small and low intensity forests’ (SLIMFS) to reduce costs for
small and low income enterprises.
While their standards have come to resemble each other more closely, the
different programs are still locked in debates and contests regarding
appropriate standards for a number of controversial issues, such as
allowable levels of clear cutting, use of pesticides and genetically modified
organisms, duties to communities and workers, and the availability of
certification information to the public. These are manifested through their
contending systems of rules and procedures.
Procedures and Roles
There has also been considerable convergence on appropriate practices
and procedures among the programs. Indeed, since they are essentially
extra-governmental regulatory systems, it is not surprising that they have
focused a great deal on administrative law questions – i.e., general rules
for rule making, adjudication, and information gathering and sharing (see
generally, Meidinger 2006). On the whole, the programs have
concentrated on their standard setting processes, gradually making them
more transparent and participatory. Today they all appear to follow notice
and comment procedures similar to administrative agencies in most
modern states. Certification programs also increasingly acknowledge
duties to respond to public comments and to explain their policies in
reasoned ways. Additionally, all of the programs are trying to demonstrate
participation by diverse interests in their deliberations. The FSC has gone
much farther in this regard than most industry programs, which typically
seek to maintain industry control over policy making, but even the industry
programs acknowledge a need for broad-based stakeholder participation
and seek to foster it in various ways.
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Similarly, much effort has gone into defining appropriate standards,
procedures, and accountability structures for certifiers. The programs
differ on how certifiers ought to be accredited (with most PEFC programs
relying on generalized ISO accreditation agencies and the FSC relying on
a program it originally created and later spun off), but they all stress the
professionalism and ostensible independence of certifiers and increasingly
seek to provide formal auditing systems for certifier decisions. Moreover,
following the FSC, the programs are beginning to require that certifiers
publish public summaries of their findings, thereby subjecting
administrative adjudications as well as rulemakings to public scrutiny. The
FSC also requires stakeholder consultations as part of the certification
process; the PEFC programs sometimes do, but not always. Hence, while
the certification programs stress the importance of defined roles and
procedures, they have also blurred the social boundaries between
administrators and the public by providing for increased participation,
transparency, and responsiveness in rulemaking and adjudication
procedures. They thus manifest the dual reliance on expertise and
participation that characterizes many Western state regulatory programs
today.
Equally importantly, forest certification programs have blurred the
boundaries between regulatory programs and firms, both by giving firms a
larger official role in defining regulatory standards and by using internal
control systems (EMSs) to harness the firms to regulatory goals. This
approach no longer treats the firm as a black box responsible simply for
producing certain outputs, but rather as part of the regulatory program,
with its own organizational and technological resources that can be
committed to defining, implementing, and revising regulatory goals (Parker
2000; Coglianese and Nash 2001, Potoski and Prakash 2005,
Vandenbergh 2005). In practice, the EMS approach also seems to have
the effect of further ‘legalizing’ forest management operations internally,
since certifiers demand to see detailed documentation of planning,
implementation, monitoring and correction processes and responsibilities.
Network Organization
Together, the forest certification programs have consolidated extensive
transnational alliances into complex interconnected networks of market
participants, environmental and social activists, forestry and certification
professionals, and many others (including government officials, as
discussed in the next section). These networks have been growing over
time and also contending with each other about questions such as the
appropriate level of centralization and the nature and role of nodes.

Page 10 of 30

Meidinger, Beyond Westphalia

Draft 2.2

The FSC arguably initiated this process by bringing environmental, labor,
human and indigenous rights groups and others into what had originally
been a rather closed circle of professional foresters and landowners or
managers. It continues to try to expand its network through strategies
such as attempting to appeal to more small landholders and small
enterprises through program changes and trying to strengthen its alliances
with similar interests in other economic sectors. One of the most important
steps in this latter process has been its participation in the International
Social and Environmental Accreditation and Labelling Alliance, which also
includes low wage labor, organic agriculture, fisheries, and other labeling
programs.
Overall, the establishment of the nationally-federated PEFC together with
the growing reach and complexity of the FSC have prompted the FSC to
move toward decentralization. It has established regional offices and is
increasingly focusing on national programs as its fundamental elements
(although this strategy remains subject to debate by those who think that
the FSC should represent an emerging transnational public, rather than
agglomeration of national ones). At the same time, the FSC increasingly
sees itself not as a free-standing program, but rather as part of the larger
emerging global forest certification and governance system. Its executive
director describes FSC’s role as being ‘a global pacesetter for
development of standards and certification’ (Leideker 2003).
In sum, while competition among the alternative certification programs
originally seemed to imply the fragmentation, and possibly the
disintegration of forest certification, that has not occurred. The programs
have moved into various kinds of complex linkages as a part of their
competition. Formerly hostile groups, particularly professional foresters
and land owners, have been turned from outright opponents of forest
certification, to proponents, but of their own programs. This inevitably put
them in dialogue and mutual surveillance with the FSC program, and
seems to have begun a process of investing them in the forest certification
system as a whole. Most participants in the certification system seem to
be aware that they have developed a considerable amount of mutual
interdependence. They all have an investment in the value and validity of
certification, and they understand that they will realize some of their goals
through their competitors. The proliferation of forest certification has thus
helped to consolidate a multi-interest global network engaged in
discussions, debates, and institutional competition over appropriate
standards and methods for forestry regulation. If this network persists it
may constitute an important new type of global regulatory community over
time.
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Legalization
As the above sections make clear, the field of forest certification is
strikingly ‘legalized’. This term has several salient features here. The first
is a heavy reliance on formal rules and definitions of roles. Important
issues are routinely resolved and memorialized in rules and decisions.
Participants almost universally seek to draw on principles, standards, and
rules to define the rights and duties of different kinds of actors, organize
their behavior as a whole, and resolve disputes. Most rules and policies
are enunciated in formalized procedures and justified in normative terms.
Much debate takes place in terms of what constitutes good forest
management and a proper allocation of authority, but this debate takes
place in the form of contending, heavily legalized regulatory systems.
Certification programs have formally differentiated legislative, adjudicative,
and administrative authorities, and are giving increasing care to how those
authorities are defined, exercised, monitored, and revised. As noted
above, the process of legalization is producing a system-wide body of
public law stressing public notice and comment proceedings, publicly
accessible policies and decisions, participatory procedures and structures,
and reasoned explanation. At the same time, it is also producing an
extensive body of ‘private’ law in forest management firms and trading
networks, detailing multiple plans, procedures, duties, etc., and linking
them back to external requirements, although, as noted above, there is a
tug of war between external and internal legalization.
Why legal forms are being so broadly and rapidly extended is unclear. It
could be partly a kind of institutional isomorphism. Since other regulatory
and certification programs typically take these forms, forest certification
programs simply choose to do the same. Or it could be more functional. It
is possible that legalization is the best way to achieve the goals of
maintaining transnational markets while protecting environmental and
social values. Moreover, it could be desirable in part because other
programs with this form are seen as legitimate, thus helping to legitimate
the new ones (Zablowski 2006). What is clear is that the process is
widespread and probably accelerating.
The concept of legalization as used thus far is similar to that of Abbott, et
al (2000), except that it is more dynamic and contested. Legalization is not
simply a set pattern of institutional characteristics, but also a process of
contestation. Here it is helpful to note a further, largely taken-for-granted
dimension of legalization in this field – which is that the transnational
certification system draws many activities that were previously understood
as discretionary, or otherwise outside law, into in the realm of law. Thus,
although there are plural legal systems and considerable debate and
competition about which rules and whose rules will apply to any given
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activity, rules will indeed apply. These rules will in turn continue to be
elaborated and while serving as resources for political contestation.
Legalization can thus be understood a strategy for gaining governance
capacity.
Finally, it is important to note two additional characteristics of legalization
in this field. First, it is very broad and deep, seeking to integrate
environmental, economic, and social goals and to link local, national, and
transnational domains, as well as civil society, industry, and state
organizations. Thus, although there are plural, competing legal systems,
together they have great ambitions and increasing reach. Second, the
emerging systems are not inherently separate or distinct from state-based
law. In fact, as the next section indicates, they are becoming increasingly
intertwined with state law.

3. Relationships to State Governance
Just as environmentalist-oriented and industry-oriented certification
programs appear to be growing together into a larger system, so too does
forest certification seem to be growing together with state regulatory and
management programs, albeit more slowly and sporadically. The FSC
program, although formally independent of states, has as its first principle
that forest management operations ‘shall respect all applicable laws of the
country in which they occur, and international treaties and agreements to
which the country is a signatory. . .’ Thus, forest certification can be seen
as a way of both bolstering state based legal systems and also drawing
upon their legitimacy.
Proprietary Activities
Forest certification has received various kinds of direct resource support
from governments. The FSC, for example, received early funding from
Austria and later from the Netherlands and several other EU countries
(most recently rent-free offices in Bonn for 25 years). Several European
countries and numerous municipalities have adopted green procurement
policies roughly tracking FSC requirements (Tarasofsky et al 2005). These
have prompted the PEFC to change some requirements to make its
products eligible for government purchase. So popular and controversial
are these procurement programs that the EU is currently working on a
policy regarding appropriate rules for government forest products
procurement.
Interestingly, a growing number of states, provinces, and municipalities
(ranging from Poland to Minnesota to Freiburg, Germany) have had their
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own forests certified. In most cases they do this not in response to
allegations that the state forests are failing to meet legal requirements, but
rather to demonstrate that government-run forests meet the highest public
standards, implicitly acknowledging that governments no longer claim to
be the sole arbiters of public duties and legitimacy (see also Scott 2002).
Regulatory Activities
Some governments are also taking advantage of certification programs in
regulating non-state entities. A few (e.g., Guatemala for the Maya
Bioreserve) have made certification a requirement of conducting forestry
in their jurisdictions. Others (e.g., Bolivia and Estonia) have adopted
substantive requirements that are essentially identical to those of
certification programs. Typically, this seems to have occurred because the
public deliberations on certification standards have directly influenced
contemporaneous public deliberations on state standards. When
standards are identical or even very similar, it is apparent that certification
of a firm can be seen as tantamount to compliance with law. This would
also be the case when a certification standard is stricter, but requires
compliance with state law and treaties, as is the case with the FSC. Some
countries have officially adopted the position that certification of a firm
creates a presumption of legal compliance. Given the costs of conducting
inspections, it seems likely that other countries will follow it implicitly (see
generally, Meidinger forthcoming).
Certification programs are also trying to position themselves to shape
state regulatory requirements in the future. International trade law requires
WTO members to use recognized international standards in adopting
internal technical regulations and standards applicable to internationally
traded goods.1 Over time it seems likely that international trade law will
promote the absorption of certification standards into state legal systems.
Certification standards are also likely to be pulled into state legal systems
indirectly through such channels as tort standards for reasonable care and
administrative expectations of best practices as interpreted by inspectors.
These are slow, and sometimes empirically intricate processes, however,
and no substantial research seems to have addressed them to date.
Finally, certification programs are closely interconnected with a recent
intergovernmental initiative to fight illegal logging in tropical countries.
Spurred by a 1998 G-8 Summit calling for governments to join forces in
dealing with the problem, the Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and
Trade Action Plan (FLEGT -- a European program), and other similar
regional and bilateral programs, seek to eliminate access to developed
1

E.g., Article 2.2, Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement.
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markets of legally produced timber. Thus timber imported from threatened
forests must be certified as legal, and existing forest certification programs
offer a way of both providing such certification and possibly leveraging
improved forest management generally.
At a broad scale, it is arguable that the certification programs are giving
shape to a new transnational forest regulatory and governance regime,
one that is centered in the competition among certification programs, but
also involves continuing monitoring and participation by governments,
corporations, and NGOs at the transnational, national, and local levels.
The emerging regime centers on plural and competing, yet
interconnected, systems of rules and duties, draws in and yet requires
changes in state legal systems, and thus both strengthens and threatens
to displace them, depending on the particular situation.

4. Other Sectors
The analysis thus far has concentrated on forestry, begging the question
whether the competitive legalizatation that it describes is exceptional or
more general. This question is not easy to answer at this stage, both
because developments in every sector are highly complex and because
relatively little research along the lines outlined above has been carried
out. This paper therefore makes some tentative comparisons with other
sectors that are necessarily subject to great elaboration and revision in the
future.
Organic Agriculture
Organic agriculture certification was a direct precursor of forest
certification, since some of the FSC founders had prior experience with
organic certification. Like the FSC, the organic agriculture movement had
its roots in efforts to reform natural resource management – in this case
stopping the use of chemical pesticides, herbicides, and fertilizers,
avoiding monocultures, protecting ecological systems, and generally
keeping people and animals healthier (Conford 2001). Unlike forest
certification, however, this movement was premised on a belief that
adherence to its principles would directly benefit end consumers, since
organically grown foods were believed to be healthier and safer. Thus, it fit
better with traditional standard setting and certification processes, which
are also premised on the belief that certified products will perform better
than uncertified ones. Still, it was partly a moral and ethical movement
aimed at defining a right way of living.
While the history of the organic agriculture is far too complicated to
summarize here, it can be roughly sketched in several phases. In the first
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half of the 20th century reformers developed the rationale for organic
agriculture and founded various model farms and communities. In the
1960s and 1970s these foundations combined with several chemical
scares and the environmental movement to catalyze the first organic
certification movement. Interestingly, although a German program dated
from the 1920s (Coleman and Reed, this volume), most non-governmental
certification programs were founded almost simultaneously at the state
and international levels. Thus, organic certification programs in California,
Oregon and Washington were immediately complemented by the
International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements (IFOAM),
although IFOAM only managed to promulgate its first standards in 1980
(Bolster 2006).
Organic certification in the US has long been a competitive field, and
practices evidently have varied greatly among certifiers and jurisdictions.
IFOAM finally launched an accreditation program in 1992, but by this time
many certifiers had established business and chose not to seek IFOAM
accreditation. Certification schemes and organizations proliferated,
creating an increasingly complex and inconsistent patchwork that came to
be understood as a significant problem.
This ‘tower of Babel’ paved the way for the US Organic Foods Production
Act (OFPA) in 1990.2 While mandating national standards for organic
agriculture certification, the OFPA failed to define ‘organic’, leaving it to
the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) working with a nongovernmental advisory committee, the National Organic Standards Board
(NOSB). The Act also requires that any food carrying the label ‘organic’ be
certified as such by an organization that has undergone accreditation by a
division of the USDA, rather than the IFOAM affiliated International
Organic Accreditation Service. Most of the accredited certifiers are private
organizations, although some are states and some are based in foreign
countries (Coleman and Reed, this volume).
Overall, the standards promulgated through the US regulatory system
tend to be lenient. The USDA has sided with large-scale agriculture and
overridden a number of NOSB recommendations by allowing the use of
genetically engineered crops, application of sewage sludge to crops, and
use of irradiation in producing foods that can be labeled ‘organic’ (Bolster
1996). Moreover, the US standard does not require ecological practices
beyond limitations on ingredients and entirely ignores concerns about the
treatment animals.

2

Food, Agriculture, Conservation and Trade Act of 1990, Pub.L. No. 101-624, Title XXI, Organic
Food Production Act, 104 Stat. 3359, 3937 (1990), 7 U.S.C. § 6501-6523.
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Perhaps the most portentous effect of the federal program is to
preemptively define the meaning of ‘organic’ in US commerce – including
for imported foods – at a relatively low level. Farmers are free to exceed
the standard if they wish, and states or other programs may set stricter
standards, but they are forced to use additional labels or information to
communicate that fact. Similar patterns are evident internationally, where
a number of major national governments have largely ignored central
elements of the IFOAM standards, and even those of countries they trade
with, in promulgating their own. IFOAM is currently working on a major
revision of its standard, with the hope that it can shape the development of
future governmental and other standards by leading the way in defining
core principles and concepts. It will be an interesting test of the
transnational regulatory system to see whether and how well governments
respond to this IFOAM initiative and to each other’s standards.
International trade law may provide at least some positive incentive to do
so, since it prohibits technical requirements for internationally traded
products that are ‘unnecessary obstacles to trade’ or ‘more traderestrictive than necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective’ and also enjoins
governments to use recognized international standards when possible.3
Fisheries
Although fisheries comprise a large part of the earth’s surface, the social
world of fisheries regulation is considerably smaller than that of agriculture
regulation. Most ocean fisheries have long been in decline due to heavy
fishing pressure and deteriorating environmental conditions. In 1997 WWF
joined with Unilever, one of the world’s largest buyers of fish, to establish
the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC). Modeled in large part on the FSC,
the MSC defines itself as ‘an independent, global, non-profit organization
whose role is to recognize, via a certification program, well-managed
fisheries and to harness consumer preference for seafood products
bearing the MSC label of approval’. The MSC standards are largely
environmental and operational, omitting social issues. The MSC has
accredited a small group of certification organizations, some of which
concentrate on fisheries and others on market chains carrying certified
fish. Approximately eighteen fisheries have been certified to date, with a
similar number under consideration.
In certifying whole fisheries the MSC is in part certifying governments,
since their cooperation and effective enforcement is essential to curbing
the tragedy of the commons that typically affects fisheries. Although it
provides for public comment and participation in standard setting and
certification processes, the MSC has a much more limited stakeholder
structure than either the FSC or IFOAM, and seems to operate on a more
3

Article 2.2, TBT Agreement.
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technocratic basis. Its influence on world fisheries governance is more
preliminary and unclear as well. But at this point it seems plausible that
the MSC process could eventually stimulate the production of relatively
widely accepted standards and procedures for certifying sustainable
fisheries – provided of course that certified fisheries in fact prove
sustainable.
Apparel
Global apparel markets have long been seen both as exacerbating
mistreatment of third-world workers and as offering a possible way to
improve their conditions by making revenues contingent on proper
treatment of workers. The 1980s brought a flurry of corporate codes of
conduct by branded companies in response to highly publicized cases of
worker abuse tied to their brands. These were often linked to actual or
threatened consumer boycotts. In the late 1990s three separate apparel
certification programs were founded, mainly with the goal of improving the
consistency and implementation of codes of conduct. Two of them, Social
Accountability International (SAI) and the Fair Labor Association (FLA),
were primarily the offspring of NGOS and governments, while the third,
Worldwide Responsible Apparel Production (WRAP), was founded by the
industry (Bartley 2003). SAI and WRAP certify individual factories,
whereas FLA certifies entire supply chains. Competition among the
programs has been intense and contentious at times.
The apparel certification programs have been able to draw on labor
standards developed by governments and intergovernmental
organizations, mainly the UN-based International Labor Organization
(ILO). Still, a high level of contention about proper standards persists. As
in organic certification, there is considerable disagreement among
governments, and between governments and certification programs. Most
governments of third world countries have been anxious not to be seen as
havens for labor abuse, but also not to be forced into strict labor standards
that might reduce their comparative advantage in this highly pricecompetitive and volatile industry. These complexities combined with the
inherent difficulty of regulating labor conditions in far-flung and rapidly
rotating factories make it clear that achieving effective global governance
over labor conditions in apparel production will be enormously difficult.
While the certification programs have led to notable improvements in
particular cases, it is difficult to document widespread effects.
Nonetheless, one school of thought strongly argues that the presence of
certification programs has helped to ‘ratchet up’ worldwide labor standards
generally, and it does seem plausible that the overall labor situation would
be even worse without apparel certification programs (Fung et al 2001).
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Mining
Mining is one of the most intriguing sectors in which regulation by
certification has been attempted. Particularly in developing countries, the
mining industry has a reputation for being exploitive in the fullest sense of
the word. And yet, this dubious reputation has also been a source of
regulatory leverage in the global market, as mining companies seek to
avoid campaigns like the recent one against ‘blood’ or ‘conflict’ diamonds.
Mining certification began in the African diamond industry, after several
NGOs demonstrated that rebel groups were using revenues from diamond
mines to fuel brutal civil wars in Sierra Leone, Angola, and Congo
(Campbell 2002). In the ‘Kimberley Process’ they were able to cooperate
with business interests (mainly the virtual monopolist, DeBeers) and
governments to establish a program for certifying diamonds as not having
helped to finance civil wars (Kimberly Process). The process took about
three years and seems to have produced a well functioning certification
program. DeBeers used its virtually unique expertise to work out many of
the operational details of the program and the main NGO involved (Global
Watch) was able to successfully push for external auditing (Kantz 2006).
The governments directly affected were very supportive of the program
because it helped reduce rebel activity and challenges to their authority.
Since the Kimberly Process Certification Program was created to address
a specific, relatively narrow problem, the question remains whether
certification programs can be instituted to address the larger challenges of
environmental and community protection posed by mining. At present the
sector involves a hodgepodge of individual company codes of conduct
(e.g., Newmont Mining 2006), limited subsector initiatives (e.g., CRPP
2006), and proposals for sector-wide certification programs (e.g., MCEP
2006). The most important of the sector-wide proposals, the WWFsupported Mining Certification Evaluation Project (MCEP 2006), concludes
that there is enough convergence in the various initiatives to support the
establishment of an industry-wide third-party certification program
involving broad stakeholder participation and covering environmental,
human rights, worker health and safety and community issues, among
others. Whether such a program is created remains to be seen, but if it is,
it may be a quite remarkable extension on all that has come before it.

5. Impacts
The first question commonly raised about regulatory systems like the ones
described above is how effective they can be. They rely primarily on ‘soft’
law rules and quasi-voluntary implementation structures, meaning that
states play a relatively small role in making and enforcing the rules. Thus,
if certification-centered regulation is effective, the primary mechanisms are
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not likely to be those associated with state-based legal systems. While it is
too early to draw strong conclusions on the question of efficacy, there is a
growing body of research suggesting that certification has significant
effects on management practices as well as larger governance structures,
certainly in the case of forestry (Bass et al 2001; Cashore et al 2006),
probably in the cases of organic agriculture (e.g., Allen and Kovach 2000;
Greer 2002; Marshall and Standifird 2005) and apparel (Elliott and
Freeman 2003; Fichter and Sydow 2002), and likely in the future case of
mining certification (MCEP 2006).
The largest amount of research has been done in the field of forest
certification. A recent set of systematic studies of forest certification in
sixteen developing and transitioning countries found a host of effects on
forest management and local governance institutions (Cashore et al
2006). Most cases indicated that the adoption forest certification has led to
improved environmental management practices in the industry, including
better inventorying and planning, silvicultural practices, biodiversity
protection, environmental monitoring, and training. In addition, certification
has sometimes stimulated the introduction of entire new concepts, such as
the Estonian ‘spring truce’, a time during which forestry is curtailed so as
to avoid disturbing reproduction patterns of forest fauna. Forest
certification has also led to improved labor conditions in many cases,
ranging from the provision of protective clothing and shielded tools to
better training and sanitary conditions.
Equally importantly, the introduction of forest certification has led to
various ‘network effects’ in local governance structures. In some countries
with relatively closed governance structures the introduction of forest
certification has led to the inclusion of previously excluded groups
(typically environmental, labor and community groups) and seems also in
some cases to have rebalanced power away from government officials
and industry. The amount of change varies greatly among cases,
however, and it is impossible to know at this stage how persistent these
changes will be.
To date, the effectiveness of certification programs in forestry as well as
other sectors has depended heavily on the ability of activist regulatory
entrepreneurs to use market chains to both pressure and monitor changes
in forestry practices. Their capacity to do so is unlikely to continue
indefinitely. Moreover, although perhaps to a lesser extent in the case of
agriculture, global inequalities are an important part of program
effectiveness. Thus, forest, apparel, and mining certification affect
practices in developing countries because failure to achieve certification
portends potentially serious losses of revenues from developed countries.
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If international income inequalities decline over time, domestic demand for
certified products in developing countries will have to rise to maintain
market pressure and support for certification requirements, unless they
have already been incorporated in a broader set of regulatory structures.
The mechanisms of certification’s efficacy go well beyond market pressure
and surveillance; it seems clear that they must operate through the
general process of institutionalization, wherein changed practices become
routine and taken-for-granted over time, ultimately shifting cultural
understandings of appropriate behavior. While it is apparent from the
general literature on institutionalization (e.g., DiMaggio and Powell 1983;
Colyvas and Powell, 2006) that this process is likely to occur, there has
been little research to date documenting its dynamics in certification based
regulatory systems. It seems reasonable to expect that insitutionalization
will operate through a variety of pathways, including routine interactions
within firms and among wood producers, processors, and buyers as well
as changing assumptions in professional education. It will be important to
try to understand how the tendency toward legalization – i.e., the formal
expression of rights, duties and expectations together with the
development of increasingly elaborate justificatory rationales and
implementation institutions –affects institutionalization. The same goes for
the effect of mutually reinforcing legal orders slowly bringing extragovernmental orders into alignment with governmental ones. Ultimately, if
some critics of ostensibly technocratic standard setting processes are
correct, the effects should be visible as changes in the very identities of
the participants in the regulatory systems (Wood 2004).
Finally, to say that certification systems have significantly affected
resource management and governance structures and that they are
expanding and linking up with each other and with state systems is not to
say that they are adequate to handle the problems they seek to address.
Each of the certification centered regulatory systems discussed in this
paper has been vehemently criticized as inadequate to the task at hand.
Some critics even argue that they are counterproductive, since they may
give the impression of offering solutions without the reality, thus diverting
attention and resources from ‘real’ solutions (e.g., Latin 2005). These
criticisms and the underlying questions they pose cannot be firmly
answered at this stage, since the systems are still in formative stages and
have not been carefully studied. Furthermore, the question of adequacy
demands a referent – adequate in relation to what? And here there is a
huge problem, because the perfect ‘hard’ regulatory systems do not exist
and appear to have no prospect of coming into being in the near term.
Even so, however, eventually this question will have to be addressed head
on: has the turn toward certification based regulatory systems been an
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effective move, or a fundamental mistake? Fortunately or unfortunately,
that time has not yet arrived. Moreover, part of the answer will
undoubtedly depend on questions beyond simple effectiveness.

6. Broader Implications
While the regulatory systems described in this paper employ conventional
standard setting and certification techniques, they simultaneously
constitute new institutional arrangements with potentially significant
implications for law, society, and their changing relationship.
Law
The argument of this paper is that emerging certification-based regulatory
systems entail a particular and somewhat novel kind of law making. Even
prior to certification programs, the emergence of global markets typically
generates legal pluralism on its own, since different parts of the expanded
social space delimited by the market are subject to different territorially
based legal regimes. At the same time, actors in one part of the market
are both implicated and increasingly understood as having interests in
actions in other parts, as the results of their transactions have effects
there. Global certification programs are efforts by self-appointed non-state
officials to bring these interests and effects into a common legal regime.
Yet in the cases discussed above, the creation of one certification regime
typically provokes establishment of at least one other, and often significant
developments in state regulation as well, all of them with increasingly
transnational reach. Thus, at any given point in the global market chains
discussed above there are likely to be at least three operative legal orders,
an NGO-oriented one, an industry-oriented one, and probably a state one
as well.
These orders are neither independent of each other nor static. Instead,
they interact and compete, generating a larger governance structure and
associated legal system that grow increasingly dense and yet unsettled at
the same time, at least in the short run. To some extent, as discussed
above, the competing systems may tend toward convergent standards
and institutions, but the evidence for this proposition is not persuasive at
this point. The case of organic agriculture, for example, suggests
persistent and possibly expanding divergence among regimes, and this
despite the pressures of expanding international trade for harmonization.
Thus, at least in the near term, there is continued plurality and
contestation. While there may be ‘more’ and more detailed law, and while
it may permeate more social spaces, it is also deeply contingent and
contested. So much so, that it seems likely to engage more and more
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actors in each sector in the process of defining and redefining the rules,
and to face them with repeated choices about which rules to
accommodate.
Just as the spread of certification may bring those who would traditionally
have been low-level legal functionaries or addressees into active law
making roles, so also it may turn those who would have been primarily
lawmakers into legal entrepreneurs. The executive director of the FSC, for
example, sees the FSC as fundamentally a change agent, rather than a
certifier of good practice. To him the critical challenge facing the FSC is
that of ‘finding new objectives for the future’ (Liedeker 2002). Leaders of
industry based certification organizations portray their programs in similar
ways. Virtually in unison, they talk about the importance of continuous
improvement, expanding public participation, and building new
relationships across constituencies. Law making as it has been described
here is very much an entrepreneurial activity.
Much work remains to be done in describing the dynamics of these
emergent legal systems. As suggested above, it is possible that they
represent a distinctive form of law, one in which competition and change
have taken on new importance while stability and consistency have
receded. The traditional legal forms of (1) defining rights and duties
through rules (2) made through increasingly participatory, transparent, and
regularized procedures (3) implemented by specialized officials and (4)
justified in terms of normative principles are retained. Yet, change is built
into the system through both traditional processes of legislation and
adjudication and new ones of competition and contestation before a public
that remains amorphous, segmented, and very much under construction.
Society
If the above depiction of emerging legal systems is at all accurate, it poses
many important questions about what kind of society they will foster and
support. One of the most obvious is the very definition of society. The
Westphalian system of international law presumes national societies
whose governments negotiate relationships with each other and
promulgate international rules through treaties, conventions, mutually
accepted customs, and the like. Clearly, however, global markets place
pressure on that conception, since growing numbers of people are in more
regular contact with ‘foreigners’ than with many people in their own
countries, may have more in common with those foreigners, and often
work out rules to organize their interactions without significant state
involvement. Moreover, the vision of national societies has always been
problematical in many states because they contain distinct communities
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with different, often inconsistent legal traditions, most of which have been
suppressed.
Certification-based regulatory systems seem more sensitive to such
differences than are traditional national and international legal systems.
They appear to incorporate normative discourses such as human and
community rights and environmental protection much more readily than
the Westphalian system, and they officially value community protection
and participation. Moreover, their very existence as alternative legal
orders is a powerful indicator of the fact that people in the modern world
participate in and negotiate their way through multiple legal communities.
Yet certification-based regulatory systems may also have widespread
homogenizing effects over time. Their competition to define common
standards seems to have inherently centralizing tendencies. While it is
also tempered by a competition to fit local circumstances, those local
circumstances are for the most part filtered through ‘practical realities’
defined by the global economy. Pressures to accommodate the global
market make many traditional modes of existence less feasible by the day,
and certification systems seem to facilitate that trend, with their emphasis
on standard methods of operation, management systems, audited
accountability, and so on.
The problem is not purely an anthropological one, however; the question
is not simply whether traditional societies can be ‘preserved’. Rather, it is
whether they can participate in global commerce in ways that sustain their
capacity to define important terms of their own lives. If certification based
regulatory systems are indeed sufficiently responsive to diverse
communities to facilitate this process, they may help over time to construct
a world society that both preserves spaces for distinctive communities and
provides forums for interaction and negotiation among them.
At present, transnational society is organized along several different lines,
including economic sectors, states, and communities and peoples. The
interaction among these contending organizational orders is disjointed at
best. Whether one sees the emerging system as a heterarchy (e.g.,
Ehrenreich et al 1995) or a polyarchy (e.g., Dahl 2003; Cohen and Sabel
2001) or something else, the nature of the interaction among the orders is
amenable to many alternatives and carries many possible normative
implications.
Perhaps the most vexing normative implication is the thorny problem of
democracy. The emerging regulatory systems are not representational in
any traditional sense of the concept. Rather, they rely on various
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procedural devices such as transparency, expanded participation, and
reasoned explanation as substitutes, together with relatively open
interactions among the plural social ordering structures noted above. The
problem is, what kind of democracy, if any, is possible in these
circumstances? The response up to this point seems to be a conceptual
hodgepodge, with discursive and structural elements linking in multiple
and shifting forms. A particularly notable feature on the discursive side is
the reliance by many certification programs on adumbrating concepts tied
to what some commentators have described as ‘high moral authority’
(Keck and Sikkink 1998; Wapner 1995). Concepts such as human rights
and ecosystem health provide powerful reference points that help to orient
the systems, even as they remain subject to continuing elaboration and
contestation through economic, governmental, and civil society ordering
systems (e.g., Baxi 2005).
Whether the emerging regulatory ensembles will learn to perform in ways
that compose a global democracy will depend on simultaneous
development of new theoretical and empirical understandings that inform
and drive each other forward. Perhaps they will learn to implement new
forms of cosmopolitan democracy (Held 2000), and perhaps they will find
areas of ‘overlapping consensus’ among peoples by settling on
‘reasonable pluralism’ (Rawls 2001). Or perhaps they will converge
around quite different governance structures that may or may qualify as
‘government by the people’. No doubt we will engage in many debates on
this question in years to come.
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